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Abstract 
This paper examines the challenges associated with stimulating large-scale investment in 
energy efficiency and demand management measures, using residential energy efficiency-
improving retrofits in the UK as a case study. We consider how issues of energy policy, 
consumer choice and financial systems intersect, drawing on recent literature including 
energy policy documents and research reports, and on interviews with stakeholders from 
the finance sector, energy efficiency practitioners and more. We suggest that following the 
withdrawal of the Green Deal, there is a need to reconsider the framing of policy for 
household energy efficiency improvements, moving beyond addressing barriers and market 
failure. We examine three potential aspects of a new policy framing: energy efficiency as 
infrastructure; new business and financing models for energy efficiency provision; and 
decentralised financing institutions for energy efficiency investment.  
This would require a long-term commitment from government on energy efficiency, and a 
need to ensure that projects are attractive and investable from both householders and 
investors’ perspectives. We conclude that there are important roles for government in any 
large scale initiative for energy efficient retrofitting of UK homes, even if the mechanisms 
are market based. These include signalling long-term policy consistency and reducing risks 
for financial investment, and supporting industry innovators and decentralised actors. 
Keywords 
energy efficiency; energy policy; green finance;  demand side management (DSM); 
infrastructure 
1 Introduction  
There is widespread agreement that improving the efficiency of provision of energy services 
is an important contributor to meeting the ambitious climate change mitigation goals in the 
Paris Agreement and broader sustainability goals, including addressing fuel poverty. 
However, compared to the depth of analysis and range of policy measures aimed at 
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promoting innovation and investment in low carbon energy supply technologies, there has 
been relatively little attention paid to understanding incentives for stimulating innovation 
and investment aimed at improving energy efficiency and reducing end-use energy demand 
[1]. In particular, there is a challenge associated with promoting investment in household 
energy efficiency improvements, both for new build and for retrofit. The dominant policy 
framing of this challenge in the UK and other industrialised countries has focussed on the 
role of energy policy to address market failures or barriers to the take-up of energy 
efficiency measures [2,3]. For example, the UK government’s Clean Growth Strategy talks 
about the need to “build the market for energy efficiency” [4]( p. 77). However, attempts to 
create incentives to address these market failures and barriers have not so far attracted the 
levels of investment needed to deliver an ambitious scale of household energy efficiency 
improvement. Indeed, the previous UK flagship energy efficiency policy, the Green Deal, 
failed to attract householders or investors in large numbers, and was withdrawn after a 
short period of implementation [12,13]. Reviews of decades of energy efficiency policy in 
the UK [5] and internationally [6] raise doubts about the efficacy of a neo-classical economic 
framing and emphasise the need to take into account the range of systemic factors affecting 
household and investor decision-making. 
In this paper, we argue that this lack of policy effectiveness points to the need for a more 
systemic framing of energy efficiency investment challenges and how these could be 
overcome. Drawing on interviews with stakeholders from the policy and investment 
communities, we illustrate three aspects of a more systemic policy framing: energy 
efficiency as infrastructure; new business and financing models for energy efficiency 
provision; and decentralised financing institutions for energy efficiency investment. This 
contributes to a small but growing academic literature examining how energy finance can 
be reoriented towards low carbon investments, though this literature has mostly focussed 
on renewable energy investment [7–12]. Whilst efforts to promote standardising how 
energy efficiency projects are developed, documented and measured, such as the Investor 
Confidence Project [13], are important to enabling investment, we argue that a more 
systemic policy framing is also needed to promote significant levels of investment in 
household energy efficiency.  
Combining evidence from academic and policy literatures with insights from interviews with 
actors and experts on UK energy efficiency policy, we identify three key concerns relating to 
stimulating low carbon investment: that incentives resulting from a ‘market failure’ framing 
do not necessarily create attractive investment opportunities from the perspective of 
investors; that a lack of coherence and consistency in policy fails to deliver a stable 
environment, and creates uncertainty that hinders private sector investment; and that an 
overly centralised financial system fails to stimulate more diverse and decentralised 
investment opportunities. This leads to three implications for energy policy: the need for 
policy to create a clear direction for implementation; the challenge of linking finance to 
projects; and the scale of the domestic retrofit challenge. The paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 reviews the dominant policy framing of measures to promote investment in 
energy efficiency by households and how this has influenced UK household energy 
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efficiency policy development, which we argue demonstrates these concerns. In Section 3, 
we outline the methods of this study, drawing on expert stakeholder interviews and review 
of recent reports and policy documents. In Sections 4, 5 and 6, we describe three potential 
aspects of a more systemic framing for policy makers and industry stakeholders: energy 
efficiency as infrastructure; new business and financing models for energy efficiency 
provision; and decentralised financing institutions for energy efficiency investment, and 
discuss how attention to these aspects could help to address the above concerns for energy 
efficiency investment. Section 7 presents our conclusions.  
2 Linking energy efficiency to finance – policy and literature review 
2.1 Reorienting finance towards energy efficiency 
In recent years, questions of climate change and sustainable development have raised 
issues about the nature of global finance, with growing recognition that the finance system 
needs to be reshaped, as it “remains disconnected from the long-term needs of the real 
economy” [14](p 1) . For example, the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate 
argue that the financial system has to be transformed if it is to deliver the scale and quality 
of investment needed in order to ‘green’ the system [15], including making significant 
investments in energy efficiency in buildings, energy and transportation. Meeting the Paris 
agreement targets requires significant scaling up of the take-up of energy efficiency 
measures around the world. Circumstances and institutions vary from country to country, 
and our focus is on the UK, where energy efficiency policy is heavily market oriented. 
Nonetheless, we suggest some of the lessons in this paper are applicable in other contexts 
too: the scale of the task requires participation of private finance in most countries, as in the 
current global economic climate, public funds are limited.  
The dominant policy framing in the UK in relation to energy efficiency has been to address 
market failures or barriers to the take-up of energy efficiency measures [2,3]. One taxonomy 
[16] identifies a number of barriers, including: having a higher technical or financial risk than 
other investments; lack of perfect information of energy efficiency opportunities; hidden 
costs through utility reduction or additional costs; lack of access to capital; split incentives, 
as between landlords and tenants; and bounded rationality, due to limited time or capacity. 
Similarly, at EU level, ‘market barriers and failures’ to energy efficiency investment include a 
lack of information and high perceived risk by both users and financiers; and the lack of 
financial convention of cash flows from saving energy in an ‘asset-based culture’ [17]. 
Barriers specifically affecting the residential sector include small project size with high 
upfront costs and long payback periods; split incentives between landlords and tenants; lack 
of contractors; and lack of support for holistic retrofits (ibid.). These barriers are reflected in 
the impact assessments for energy efficiency policies in the UK, including the Green Deal 
[18]. Current risk-based capital budgeting practices favouring short-term returns on 
investment have also been identified as a barrier to energy efficiency investments [19].  
Solutions to overcoming these barriers have focussed on promoting new financing 
instruments for energy efficiency [17] and an adaptive policy design to address specific 
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barriers to low-carbon innovation along the innovation cycle for particular technologies 
[12]. Whilst these prescriptions are important, we argue that they do not provide a positive 
policy framing for attracting significant levels of investment needed for energy efficiency 
measures, nor the basis for coherent and consistent policy development in this area. A new 
policy framing is important because the current framing, based on addressing market 
barriers and failures, often does not resonate with how either household or financial actors 
frame the energy efficiency challenge. For example, NGOs in the energy efficiency field in 
the US have drawn on market transformation and collective action frames to enable 
coordination by highlighting how efficiency can be framed in a way that appeals to 
householders, industry and government priorities, while still being rooted in a market-based 
discourse [20]. 
The global role of the finance sector is key as climate change mitigation action has come to 
be associated with private profitable business [21], with policymakers looking to the private 
sector to fund the transition to a low-carbon economy [22]. However, [23] suggest that an 
impasse has emerged, with policymakers hoping that financial markets will mobilise capital 
into low-carbon investments, while market actors have no incentive to do so without 
credible action towards longer-term, stable policies.  
It is in this context that the academic literature has begun to research institutional and 
cultural challenges associated with reorienting the global financial system towards 
sustainable and low carbon investments. Structural constraints have been identified as 
delaying increases in investment in renewable energy supply in the UK [8,9] and throughout 
OECD countries [24], including immaturity of asset classes, lack of liquidity of long-term 
investments, short-term drivers pressuring fund managers and lack of secondary market 
vehicles.  
Energy efficiency measures are especially relevant to questions of finance, as deploying 
them is capital intensive and requires upfront investment, be it from household savings, 
business equity or debt finance, often with the aim of reduced energy bills or increased 
revenue in the future [25]. To illustrate the scale of capital in the UK alone, estimates of the 
potential social impact of the Green Deal and ECO showed costs of £10 billion in installation 
and £17.3 billion total costs, with benefits totalling £25.6 billion, including £15 billion in 
energy savings and £3.5 billion in comfort benefits [18]. The G20 Energy Efficiency Task 
Group has argued that energy efficiency financing is a mechanism that could accelerate the 
growth of energy efficiency business models, enabling scaling up of energy efficiency 
investments for projects that don’t have easy access to the necessary capital [26].  
However, financial investors and energy efficiency practitioners have qualitatively different 
perspectives, the former underestimating the savings potential of energy efficiency, and 
overestimating its risk, due to simplistic or conservative risk analysis; and the latter lacking 
the financial expertise to make the case for it [19]. Linking finance to projects is therefore 
not trivial; it is this gap and the role of government and policy within it that we seek to 
address. It has been argued that it is incumbent on engineers, facility managers and 
professional organisations to translate energy efficiency analysis into financial risk 
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management language [19]. We disagree, and suggest this is unrealistic for household level 
investment. Instead, we argue for reframing energy efficiency policy in a positive way to 
encourage the further development of new business and financing models for energy 
efficiency investments at a household level. 
2.2 UK household energy efficiency policy 
An international review of policies for energy efficiency suggests “policies should be kept in 
place for a decade or more in order to ensure an orderly development of energy efficiency 
markets” [6](p 571) while standards, targets and incentives be revised periodically.  
UK energy efficiency policy, though, has a record of inconsistent policy, and is currently in a 
state of flux, not least as the UK negotiates ‘Brexit’ from the European Union. At the high 
level, the UK government remains committed to addressing the energy ‘trilemma’ – meeting 
climate change targets, ensuring security of energy supply and maintaining affordability of 
energy for households and businesses. In addition, following the 2015 general election, a 
renewed emphasis has been placed on developing an industrial strategy, including “securing 
the industrial opportunities for the UK economy of energy innovation” [27](p 89). However, 
the issue of affordability of energy has been high on the political agenda for years. In August 
2017, the UK government commissioned an independent review examining how to “best 
minimise the costs of energy consistent with the overarching objectives”, to report by 
October 2017 [28]. The resulting review argued, from an economic perspective, that 
“avoiding detailed intervention is the key to keeping costs down” [29](p xiv) and that energy 
efficiency objectives should not be confused with fuel poverty objectives, which should be 
addressed through general welfare payments. However, others have argued in response 
that this approach plays down the key roles that technology and energy efficiency policies 
have played in bringing energy costs down [30,31]. 
Domestic retrofitting is significant in UK’s energy efficiency and climate change mitigation 
policy: In 2015, 23% of UK carbon emissions came from the domestic sector [32]. Domestic 
emissions are predominantly from space and water heating [33], due to the majority of 
residential buildings being constructed before 1980, and a slow rate of replacement of 
buildings [34]. However, climate policy discussions in the UK lack a systemic focus on 
demand [35], despite a long-argued need to tackle demand, rather than “decarbonis[e] an 
ever-increasing energy supply” [36](p 1). In 2012, the previous UK Coalition government 
produced an Energy Efficiency Strategy with a “mission to seize the energy efficiency 
opportunity” [2], which recognised the importance of linking financing opportunities to 
energy demand. The main household energy efficiency measure was the Green Deal, which 
aimed to provide a novel way of financing energy efficiency improvements. However, this 
scheme was discontinued in 2016, after only around 20,000 home energy improvements 
were funded between 2013-2015 [37]. We discuss the reasons for this failure and lessons to 
be learned in Section 5.1. The remaining measures are the Energy Company Obligation 
(ECO) which is an obligation on suppliers to improve energy efficiency for poorer 
households, and a roll-out of smart meters (to be offered) to every home by 2020, which 
aims to stimulate a transition to a smart energy system [38]. Improvements in energy 
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efficiency of household appliances have largely been driven in recent years by the 
implementation of European Union (EU) Directives, and it is not clear how the UK 
government intends to continue progress in this area, after the UK leaves the EU in 2019.  
At time of writing, there is still no clear successor to the Green Deal, although the UK 
government has committed to developing a replacement. In October 2017, the UK 
Government published its Clean Growth Strategy [4], setting out a framework for further 
measures to meet carbon reduction targets out to 2032, whilst minimising costs and 
maximising social and economic benefits.   While it does not give detailed policies, it calls for 
evidence, including “incentives and other levers that could encourage homeowners to 
invest in energy efficiency improvements” [4](p 77). However, the dominant framing is still 
in terms of “building the market for energy efficiency” (ibid.). This raises the question of 
whether this framing neglects important aspects of the challenge, particularly from 
investors’ perspective.  
3 Methods 
To explore these issues, we undertook a review of policy documents and research reports 
on the challenges of financing housing energy efficiency improvements in the UK, focusing 
on potential policy and financial insights which could help connect finance and energy 
efficiency, and ways to move beyond the framing of barriers and market failures as the main 
reasons for government intervention. This literature review began with prominent recent 
government documents such as the Clean Growth Strategy and the Industrial Strategy 
[4,27], reports from the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS), and 
from academic papers which reviewed policy [5,6]. We further included academic literature 
familiar from our previous work in this area and papers from literature searches for terms 
including “energy efficiency”, “UK” and “investment”. This was followed up with semi-
structured stakeholder interviews, which in turn led to a second review of further recent 
relevant reports and documents that interviewees alerted us to. We did not do a formal 
coding for inclusion of documents, but selected those most relevant to our focus on drivers 
and barriers to energy efficiency investment.  
A total of 12 expert interviews were undertaken between March and July 20171 with UK-
based stakeholders from the finance and banking sectors, policy researchers and experts, 
consultants, analysts and practitioners in energy efficiency, and local authority workers. 
These stakeholders were identified as they were experts in this area, including some 
occupying senior positions, and covering a range of perspectives. The stakeholders were 
selected through recommendations from colleagues and peers, and as members of 
organisations known to the authors. We cannot definitively state that we reached 
theoretical saturation, but we heard similar answers multiple times, and believe that a 
larger number of interviewees would have resulted in considerable overlap and repetition. 
                                                        
1
 For context, the interviews took place after the 2016 ‘Brexit’ vote, and after the publication of the 




Further, we found that the there was a fairly small pool of people with interest and 
expertise in finance and energy efficiency, and this limited potential interviewees; indeed, 
several recommendations of potential interviewees were for authors of some of the reports 
and papers we reviewed.  
A set of interview questions was developed to investigate investment options for energy 
efficiency, policy and regulatory drivers, and financial institutions, tools and business 
models. Interviewees were also asked about attitudes towards financing energy efficiency in 
their respective sectors. The questions were informed by the literature review, for example 
the critiques of the Green Deal led us to seek out interviewees’ attitudes towards it and 
what policy instruments might replace it (see section 5). Similarly, the contrast between the 
German public development bank KfW and the UK Green Investment Bank, and the notion 
of a civic energy sector, led us to ask about the role of national and local institutions (see 
Section 6). The list of interviewees is in Table 1, and the list of guiding questions is in 
Appendix 1. 
From the literature and interviews, we identified three key aspects around which 
documents and stakeholders proposed reframing policy relating to financing domestic 
energy efficiency: energy efficiency as infrastructure, new business and financing models for 
energy efficiency provision and decentralised financing institutions for energy efficiency 
investment. The first of these was a recurring theme from our initial literature review, which 
we found promising, and interviewees were asked specifically about the framing of energy 
efficiency as infrastructure. The second and third were identified as the most common other 
themes in the interviews and literature. In the following sections, we discuss how these 
aspects can inform policy and action challenges of linking available finance to energy 
efficiency projects needing financing.  
4 Energy efficiency as infrastructure 
Investing in energy efficiency in housing requires a long-term perspective, is relatively 
capital-intensive and brings social as well as private benefits. Some policy analysts therefore 
argue that this should be considered as a type of infrastructure investment, comparable to 
national investments in transport or energy supply infrastructure [39–41]. This relates to 
both to the time it would take to retrofit millions of homes, and to the high expenditure per 
household this would entail, requiring potentially long-term loans for homeowners. This is in 
line with the long-term nature of other sustainability related issues, and the idea of a 
transition to a low-carbon economy. However, the challenge arises of linking finance to 
projects, such as creating long-term finance mechanisms appropriate for homeowners.  
In this section, we examine the implications for finance and policy of considering aggregated 
energy efficiency measures in homes as an infrastructure problem. We then discuss the role 
of pensions, as an example of an institutional investor, in terms of the supply of finance for 
investment in energy efficiency.  
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4.1 The case for framing energy efficiency as infrastructure 
It has been argued that domestic energy efficiency, when suitably aggregated, could be seen 
as an infrastructure issue with investment priority in the EU [39] and UK contexts [40,41]. 
These authors argue that domestic energy efficiency investments fit the broad definition of 
infrastructure as capital investments in physical structures, which bring significant systemic 
benefits. Such investments free up capacity in the energy system; this is done via demand 
rather than supply, but that does not change the economic (or energy savings) outcomes. 
Moreover they save money through avoided investments in energy infrastructure. This logic 
has already been successfully used in ‘least cost investment’ requirements, for example in 
the US, where many states require supply-side investments to be tested against demand-
side options before permits (e.g., for power plants or transmission lines) can be issued 
[42,43]. We would add that this approach highlights, and is appropriate for, the large scale 
of investment needed to improve domestic energy efficiency in the UK. 
A retrofit company director (#11) argued that “that is exactly how government should see 
the whole energy network and energy conservation – as an infrastructure issue. Yes, and 
they should be investing in it in the same way because it’s in the public interest”.  
This reframing would require the government to intervene in order to reward the social 
benefits of these investments. Its role would be both to lead with a strategy and to provide 
capital spending where an investment gap now exists. Even where infrastructure is privately 
financed, the UK National Infrastructure Commission has argued that government roles can 
include long-term commitment to securing patient capital, providing support or insurance to 
reduce risk, and creating reliable funding streams to ensure projects are financeable [44], all 
roles with advantages for energy efficiency. There is strong support for the infrastructure 
approach from business and local authorities [40], and potentially from public opinion, as a 
2013 poll found that 57% of people believe energy efficiency should be in the government’s 
top infrastructure priority [35].  
From an economic perspective, the infrastructure approach could create jobs, stimulate 
local economies, and help poorer households [41]. It would enable subjecting energy 
efficiency projects to economic appraisals, raising their profile by highlighting their benefits, 
not only their costs [39], as a think tank analyst (#1) put it: 
“Using the same methodology that the government uses for other infrastructure, which 
it is going ahead with, in the age of austerity... We found that the refurbishment of 
buildings outperformed those other infrastructure investments [Hinkley, Crossrail and 
High Speed 2]. On a like for like basis, there is a strong economic rationale for doing 
this.” 
Therefore, the right energy efficiency policies could attract investors who currently invest in 
infrastructure projects. Nonetheless, doubt was expressed by an academic researcher (#4) 
about whether such investment would in fact yield the returns on investment that would 
make it attractive, as:  
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“at the moment it just doesn't give the kind of return to private capital that private 
capital looks for. So if the government is not prepared to subsidise it, for want of a 
better word, in some way then I don't think it is viable, no. ... I think energy is just too 
cheap at the moment [for many energy efficiency measures to make economic sense].”  
Defining energy efficiency as infrastructure would enable shifting energy efficiency to the 
capital expenditure budget, unleashing both the potential of public-private partnerships and 
the power of local and regional authorities to deliver energy efficiency and demand 
reduction measures [39]. This would also enable the benefits of energy efficiency 
investments to be compared to those of other infrastructure investments, as the 
government requires the National Infrastructure Commission to make recommendations as 
to what the most critical long-term infrastructure needs are [44]. 
While there was support for the idea of treating energy efficiency as infrastructure from 
most of the interviewees, and some had in fact worked on the idea, concerns were raised by 
consultants, including the challenge of aggregating together a large number of small 
projects:  
“I think energy efficiency has a lot in common with infrastructure in that it’s long-term, 
low risk investment. The way in which it differs very markedly from infrastructure, of 
course, is this whole issue of scale and aggregation because infrastructure funds 
typically want to invest very, very large amounts.... I have a friend who runs an 
infrastructure fund. Even if it’s €1billion, they’re kind of, ‘It’s a bit small.’” (#10) 
Another issue was that the idea isn’t well known in mainstream investment circles, leading 
to concerns over lacking a concrete ‘thing’ to invest in: 
“I guess the issue is that with infrastructure projects, whatever happens, you know, I’m 
going to own a piece of a railway for instance, or a bridge. In energy efficiency projects 
I’m going to own a sort of promise to pay the difference between what I would have 
otherwise spent on energy and what I now do because you’ve upgraded my capital. So, 
I don’t think it is the same business case.” (#3) 
These concerns highlight the difference in the challenges of financing energy efficiency and 
renewable energy. Energy efficiency is diverse and disaggregate, requiring too big an 
investment for many households, but too small for most investors. We suggest that there is 
a need for new business models and new financing models, which can help raise demand 
and link energy efficiency projects to available finance. Framing energy efficiency as 
infrastructure could help make these links, but does not in itself create innovative finance; 
in fact, new private financing models for infrastructure appear to have slowed in recent 
years in the UK [44]. Interviewees’ views also support the need for a strong and consistent 
policy framing from government, as the long-term planning and investment required for 
infrastructure mean it cannot be provided by markets alone. Even if private finance can 
provide significant infrastructure investments, there is an important role for governments 
and public finance in directing change and reorienting global finance towards sustainable 
infrastructure markets [15,45]. We turn next to look at the drivers and constraints from the 
perspective of investors, using the example of pension funds.   
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4.2  Short termism and pension funds 
We turn now to consider how framing energy efficiency as infrastructure could intersect 
with another financial issue: short termism. Changes to the global finance system including 
the expansion of capital markets have led to pressure from financial markets to maximise 
short-term returns. In addition, in the wake the 2008 global financial crisis, policies of 
quantitative easing and near zero interest rates led to expansion of liquidity, making it 
harder to source ‘patient capital’ to invest in long-term, low-return, low-risk projects 
[46,47]. This increasing ‘short-termism’ makes companies less able to invest and build value 
for the longer term, reducing the stability of the financial system, and side-lining long-term 
issues such as sustainability [21,45,48,49].  
Institutional investors such as pension funds have traditionally been seen as sources of long-
term capital. Pension funds are among the world’s largest asset owners, and they invest on 
behalf of long-term savers. Such institutional investors should be concerned with long-term 
performance, given their long-term liabilities, and that they can act as patient capital, 
investing in a counter-cyclical manner, including investment in riskier assets and at times 
when markets are weak, thereby increasing stability [24]. However,  there are structural 
constraints on low carbon investment by institutional investors, including immaturity of 
asset classes, lack of liquidity of long-term investments, short-term drivers pressuring fund 
managers and lack of secondary market vehicles [9]. Interviewees from the finance sector 
confirmed that pension funds are now seen more and more as short-termist. These could be 
due to pension funds either succumbing to political pressure or lacking the expertise to 
make long-term investment decisions [24,48], as well as easier fund management, as an 
independent consultant explained (#3): 
“Illiquid assets, which [are] very hard to value, become this sort of big, quite volatile 
element on your balance sheet. And so pension schemes are generally encouraged by 
their sponsors to be more short-term. Not necessarily because the returns are better, 
but because the management process and the accounting process dovetails better.”  
The consultant (#3) also suggested the culture of the finance world gives impetus to short-
termism, and the regulation fosters this culture. An example of this dynamic is the growing 
trend towards defined contributions (DC) pensions2, as an investment officer of a large 
pension scheme explains (#6): 
“Defined contribution pension schemes, which are the growing ones at the moment, 
it's industry convention that they invest in investments that are daily priced, so you can 
trade them daily. So there's a problem for DC schemes investing in illiquid, longer-dated 
investments.” 
However, there are now signs that such institutional investors are starting to pay attention 
to these changes, with pension funds more aware of their power. In the UK, some of the 
largest pension funds are now ‘active stewards’ of their assets [50]. Pension funds can sign 
                                                        
2
 In direct contribution (DC) pensions, the pension paid is related to the total amount paid in and how well the 
investments have done, rather than to, for example, the final salary. 
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up to ‘smarter’ schemes and indices that can enhance environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) considerations in investment decisions, making it possible to engage with climate 
finance and other issues [51]. A programme officer at an energy efficiency partnership (#9) 
explained, while some investors are governed by short-term interests, “many investors are 
working towards decarbonising their portfolios now, which is why they are becoming 
increasingly interested in investing in more energy efficient assets”. 
However, pension investments in energy efficiency schemes are largely off the radar, again 
suggesting that aggregation and linking investors to projects are key, as illustrated by a 
pension scheme officer’s (#6) experience:  
“We've also invested whereby people have aggregated all of the solar panels on houses 
in a certain area, and then we've supplied the debt for that. But we didn't go out and 
instigate that; they were looking for investors in that debt.” 
A further complication, explained by an investment bank research analyst (#2), is that 
energy efficiency is not as appealing as breakthrough technologies like electric vehicles: “It’s 
just not a theme which brokers or sector analysts are suggesting as an excitable investable 
theme at the moment compared to a few years ago”.  
Framing domestic energy efficiency as infrastructure shows that it is theoretically feasible to 
link institutional investors such as pension schemes to energy efficiency projects. We argue 
that this could satisfy the logic of long-term, low-risk investments for pensions, and their 
interest in more sustainable future and decarbonising their assets. However, this goes 
against the prevailing financial culture, where institutional investors take a de facto short-
term approach focussing on liquid assets, and are therefore less likely to invest in 
endeavours like energy efficiency as infrastructure. Even when institutional investors do 
invest in infrastructure schemes, the case for energy efficiency as such a scheme has not yet 
been made sufficiently, leaving investors either unaware or unconvinced of this avenue of 
investment, i.e., the links between financier and financeable projects still need to be made. 
Finally, the question of scale is crucial, as institutional investors require large scale 
investment, and will not normally invest in small schemes. This raises the question of 
aggregation of energy efficiency projects into large, investable packages in order for them to 
be of interest to mainstream finance mechanisms. We will consider this further in the 
context of business models and market solutions that could enhance the ability of 
investment in energy efficiency measures.  
5 Business models and markets 
Policymakers, in the UK and elsewhere, are looking to the private sector to fund the 
transition to a low-carbon economy (e.g., [22]). Private actors’ investment behaviour 
depends on policy and market signals, predictable and stable profit, and strategic potential. 
Therefore, shifting patterns of climate finance investment depends on managing project 
risks, as well as access to finance and gaining technical expertise [51]. In the context of 
energy efficiency, investments are hampered by split incentives, disaggregated scale and 
poorly understood performance (which increases risk), making conventional financing 
12 
 
mechanisms a poor fit [52]. All of this suggests considering what the current business 
models are for financing energy efficiency, and whether – in the context of the UK 
residential sector – energy efficiency retrofits can be supplied through market mechanisms. 
5.1 Lessons from the failure of the Green Deal 
The Green Deal was an ambitious initiative launched in 2013 by the UK Government to 
encourage (financially sound) households to invest in energy efficiency improvements. The 
‘pay-as-you-save’ (PAYS) finance mechanism aimed to deliver large scale retrofits without 
public subsidies in an age of austerity [37,53]. The PAYS mechanism is based on the idea of a 
loan to finance energy efficiency measures, which is paid back over time, e.g. through 
energy bills, so that for the payback period, the cost savings are effectively shared between 
the householder and the financer. Along with the Energy Company Obligation (ECO), the 
Green Deal was intended to improve residential energy efficiency, replacing two previous 
policies for household emissions reduction based on obligations on energy suppliers, the 
Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) and the Community Energy Saving Programme 
(CESP), as well as the fuel poverty reduction programme Warm Front [54,55]. The Green 
Deal is widely regarded as a failure, with original intentions of refurbishing millions of 
homes by 2020 failing to materialise, as only around 20,000 home energy improvements 
were funded between 2013-2015 [37]. 
There are various explanations of the Green Deal’s failures to attract householders, with 
[53] defining three areas to learn from. First, it was a poorly designed policy. There were no 
guarantees of energy savings and more expensive measures were effectively excluded. 
Frequent criticisms from our interviewees were that it was overly complex and bureaucratic.  
Second, the Green Deal had limited financial appeal, with interest rates above mortgage 
rates or high street secured loans, compounded by lack of grants. Even the upfront 
assessment costs (Green Deal Advice Reports) were more expensive than many households 
were willing to pay [54].  The Green Deal also failed to leverage private investment, resulting 
in a high cost to the taxpayer, when the political attraction of the Green Deal was private 
finance without government support [37,53]. Third, there was narrow engagement with 
consumers, as the policy looked solely at financial savings, ignoring home aspirations such 
as comfort, well-being and health.  
Given the Green Deal’s narrow economic framing, it is not surprising that saving money was 
the primary motivation for participating households [54]. However, an academic 
researcher’s (#4) argued that while UK homeowners might be interested in the Green Deal 
offer, “it is certainly the case that they're not prepared to finance it for themselves, except 
under rather special circumstances”, pointed out that when grants (i.e., upfront support, 
unlike PAYS) were available for retrofitting, there was no shortage of demand. In other 
words, this view suggests that a market correction with lower cost loans would be 
insufficient to solve the Green Deal’s failings.  
The Green Deal’s failure inflicted lasting damage to the retrofit sector in the UK, as the loss 
of momentum led to significant drops in the rate of retrofits since 2013 [56], with the home 
insulation rates in dropping to a 2017 low of 5% of the 2012 peak rate [57]. This lack of an 
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effective financing mechanism means that even cost-effective and comfort enhancing 
opportunities are now missed, including loft and cavity wall insulations, each of which could 
save a typical home £100 a year or more in energy bills, with a payback time of less than 
four years [58]. 
Interviewees expressed concern about where the post-Green Deal policy left us, including 
shocks to the markets and putting off skilling people in appropriate retrofitting in the future, 
as an academic researcher (#4) explained: 
“There will be a lot of people who went through that training who now have skills that 
are not being used and will make other members of the profession much less likely to 
engage in that kind of upskilling in the future. So that was, in a way, a real tragedy.” 
These shortcomings highlight both the sheer scale of the energy efficiency challenge, in 
terms of number of diverse households that have to be convinced or helped to retrofit, and 
the need for a coherent and consistent policy environment in enabling a healthy energy 
efficiency sector with enough skilled labour to carry out the work. 
Unlike the scathing criticisms cited above, most interviewees thought the PAYS mechanism 
was useful, with a sustainability officer in a local authority (#12) suggesting it would 
incentivise people if it had a low or 0% interest rate. Several interviewees said that the basic 
structure of the Green Deal was sound, as this analyst (#1) put it:  
“The Green Deal Finance Company was a really excellent initiative. The problem was 
there was never a focus on how you were going to change demand at scale. Actually, 
that whole programme, the Green Deal, with a few tweaks around demand creation 
would have really nailed the issue on how we connect capital to projects.” 
While the head of an energy efficiency NGO (#7) suggested that the Green Deal did what 
many in the energy efficiency field expected, appealing to certain households only, and: 
“It was only a political decision to characterise the Green Deal as something that was 
going to solve every problem that meant that it failed. So I think it was mis-sold by the 
politicians.”  
However, others disagreed, with one policy expert (#8) questioning the Green Deal focus on 
getting the interest rates right, “Or is it that it simply doesn't work effectively as an opt-in 
model, that you have to create a systematic model?”. Another point raised was how poorer 
households would be served by these business models. A programme officer at an energy 
efficiency partnership (#9) suggested the Green Deal’s goals could be achieved by leaving it 
to energy planners, and that:  
“If you find a better way to benchmark, to evaluate, and monitor your projects then 
there you go, you don't necessarily need an innovative business model in order to make 
that work.”  
We suggest that the focus on financial barriers was inadequate in its appeal to homeowners, 
certainly correcting the ‘market failure’ of the Green Deal with lower cost loans would be 
insufficient, and that a different engagement with households would be necessary. The 
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Green Deal would in any case be limited to economically attractive measures and to 
households able to pay an upfront cost and motivated primarily by finance (i.e., return on 
investment).  
Considerable research into the decision-making of homeowners who undertake energy 
efficiency retrofitting indicates that, while financial concerns are important, so are context, 
routine and disruption, and social influences (for a good review see [59]). Recent research 
further highlights the importance of positive experience in both process and outcome, 
recommending social networking for homeowners to share experience and 
recommendations [60]. Some interviewees mentioned comfort and long-term guarantees as 
crucial for a successful business model. The director of an energy advisory company (#10) 
highlighted the importance of a good ‘value proposition’ (offer to customers):  
“Comfort and modern housing, or housing that’s fit for the 21st century, is a much 
better customer proposition than, ‘You might save a couple hundred quid on your 
energy bill.’ With the emphasis on might because you’re not actually that sure... You 
retrofit because you want a modern, comfortable, healthy house.” 
This matches applied behavioural research, which recommends situating energy efficiency 
retrofits within the broader question of why homeowners renovate their homes, and 
considering everyday life in energy policy, not just one-off decisions [61]. With this in mind, 
the next section considers on how new business models might be built, learning from the 
Green Deal. 
5.2 New business and financing models  
This section considers the prospects for new business and financing models that might learn 
from the Green Deal, and successfully increase uptake of good quality energy efficiency 
measures in UK households. We focus on two examples: revolving funds and holistic, whole-
house retrofits.  
One proposed financing approach using the pay-as-you-save (PAYS) model is the revolving 
fund, which is based on the idea of capital raised being circulated and used more than once: 
loans are repaid with interest, replenishing the fund and allowing for further loans to be 
made. Revolving funds are established with the intention of being self-sufficient for long 
periods, usually requiring a one-time initial investment with capital coming from public 
sector or private sector loans [17,62]. This model has been suggested for household energy 
efficiency [63]: Initial funding, probably from private investors, is collected in a ‘special 
purpose vehicle’ (SPV), which invests funds in domestic energy efficiency measures. 
Participating households in turn make regular repayments to the SPV, allowing it to pay 
installers, and over the longer term, repay investors, potentially making the fund cost 
neutral over time.  
There are advantages and disadvantages to a revolving fund [17,63]. The PAYS mechanism 
offers households a share of the energy savings generated, while the aggregation of many 
households offers a more attractive scale of investment to finance, with economies of scale 
reducing cost and risk. Revolving funds can reduce dependency on external investors, 
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offering a long-term financing structure, potentially free from political influence. However,   
this model requires the government to underwrite loans to homeowners, in order to 
mitigate investment risks, which could be interpreted as a subsidy to the private sector. 
Further, revolving funds in energy efficiency require substantial upfront investment and 
could be cumbersome and expensive to administer. Finally, as with the Green Deal, the 
market orientation means the fund might be limited to economically attractive measures 
and exclude poorer households; this might not suffice to meet climate change 
commitments, and market forces could mean local government and communities lose 
power over deciding local priorities. A framing of energy efficiency as (part of) a long-term 
government vision could address many of these issues, e.g., by offering reassurances to 
private investors, prioritising administration and regulation to guarantee energy savings, 
and leaving decision making powers in the hands of homeowners and local authorities. 
A very different approach is taken by a recent study of residential retrofits in the UK [64], 
suggesting a successful business model would include a value proposition which focuses on 
“aesthetics, comfort, health and wellbeing”; guaranteed energy savings; a simplified 
customer interface; and a low-cost financial model. The study criticises the ‘atomised’ 
business model, which suffers from a siloed supply chain, focusing on individual measures 
installed by separate contractors, and does not guarantee energy performance. It rather 
supports whole house retrofits and a ‘one-stop shop’ providing customers with a single 
point of contact. The whole house retrofit approach opens the possibility of a wider market, 
as it can attract homeowners interested in renovation who had not considered improving 
the energy efficiency of their homes – and could enable policy to bundle energy efficiency 
measures with other home renovation measures [61]. One example is Energiesprong [65], a 
company offering whole house retrofits with an innovative business model: retrofits are 
financed through energy savings and reduced maintenance costs (for housing associations); 
the company uses the social housing sector to launch their market; and they work with 
governments to improve regulations. The market approach of Energiesprong is in line with 
the opinions of the director of an energy advisory company (#10): 
“If you came up with the right business model that was very popular in a particular 
market segment like single-family homes or large apartment blocks run by housing 
associations, if you have the right customer proposition, you would be overwhelmed by 
demand I suspect. Nobody seems to have come up with that customer proposition yet.”  
On the other hand, the fact that no business has come up with the right customer 
proposition is telling, and indeed, other interviewees’ disputed the idea that new business 
models were needed, and whether, in fact, the market approach was the right one. 
Regardless of business model, most interviewees agreed that lack of available finance was 
not the main barrier to investment in energy efficiency. Rather, there needs to be 
demonstrable demand in place for the finance world to have the confidence to invest, as 
head of an energy efficiency NGO put it (#7): 
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“We keep being told that the finance companies are keen on this, yet they're not 
pushing it. I can only conclude, from that, that they don't think there's a market at the 
moment. It's not worth them promoting this.” 
Finally, it is worth considering the scale of the challenge: energy efficiency is not a single 
market, but includes a range of end-users and decision makers in small dispersed projects 
[17]. It is hard to picture how a single, successful business model would appeal to all 
households; rather, there is a need for diverse and robust policies to support and convince a 
large number of diverse homeowners and other households in their decision to retrofit. For 
example, PAYS schemes are better suited to well off homeowners, while poorer households 
might require grants; and privately rented properties need different mechanisms due to the 
split incentives between landlords and tenants. In addition, specific measures to tackle more 
expensive ‘deep’ renovation are needed, such as obligations to direct a proportion of funds 
towards deep renovation or through special funding streams with contributions from the 
private sector [66].  
In summary, the consideration of new business models does not lead to simple, nor fully 
agreed on policy solutions. However, there is general agreement of a need to engage 
consumers beyond the financial reasoning to establish demand; and that in order to link 
finance and demand, trust must be built through guaranteed savings for householders, and 
returns for financiers. We turn next to the role that more trusted institutions, including local 
and regional initiatives, could play in successful energy efficiency programmes.  
6 Decentralisation, local and regional solutions 
Another route for financing energy efficiency would be through dedicated institutions such 
as banks, which can provide investments that target policy priorities, or initiatives that 
might come from local authorities or local and regional partnerships.  
6.1 Dedicated banks 
State investment banks (SIBs) can catalyse low-carbon investments directly through capital 
provision, but also indirectly through ‘de-risking’ investments and ‘crowding in’ private 
finance by being a first or early mover. They can also play an educational role by assessing 
low carbon projects more in-depth than financial actors can, and signalling to the 
investment community that investments are trustworthy [67]. Beyond individual financial 
mechanisms, SIBs can play a part in implementing policy visions by taking on a ‘mission-
oriented’ role, shaping and creating markets, not just addressing market failures [68]. 
In 2012, the UK launched the Green Investment Bank (GIB) with the government as its sole 
shareholder [69]. This was in line with suggestions following the global recession of 2008 
that such a bank could strategically use public finance to secure private investment in low 
carbon infrastructure [70], and it has in fact been successful in lowering the cost of capital 
for more ‘difficult’ green infrastructure projects [69]. The GIB has successfully addressed a 
range of barriers for energy efficiency investment using skilled personnel and specialist 
funds and financial tools [67] but it has only financed energy efficiency measures for large 
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scale consumers [8,69]. It has not played a major role in domestic (or other small scale) 
energy efficiency measures, and only lends in terms equivalent to those of commercial 
banks [67].  In contrast, the German public development bank KfW is considered a success 
in investments for energy efficiency improvements, having financed retrofits in 9 million 
homes (as of 2010) to higher energy efficiency standards as of 2010 [71]. KfW uses its strong 
credit rating to source capital with which it offers refinancing options for energy efficiency 
loans and renewable energy projects, lending to fund smaller scale loans and enabling the 
local energy sector to grow [8,72].  
This is an example of how the UK’s centralised, market-based finance is structurally unsuited 
for supporting small scale energy projects, resulting in a ‘finance gap’ for projects below city 
level [8]. Some think “there's a clear logic for the Green Investment Bank to get involved [in 
domestic energy efficiency], in the sense that it's a very cost effective way of reducing 
carbon”, as the head of an energy efficiency NGO (#7) put it, and therefore “surely, it should 
be high on the list of priorities for something like the Green Investment Bank”. Given the 
scale of the energy efficiency challenge, a central body like the GIB which can manages 
lower cost loans, as the KfW does, is worth consideration; however, this would require more 
direction and long-term vision from government. Further, it requires energy efficiency 
investments to be made before renewable subsidies are paid, sending a clear message 
about demand (and emissions) reduction. An academic researcher (#4) explained that 
households had to put up a considerable part of the money for retrofits, but the greater the 
level of energy efficiency they aspired to, the higher the grant they received. 
“And that seems, in the German context at least, to have been quite effective in 
encouraging householders who [wanted] to improve their energy efficiency, actually to 
go that one step further than they might otherwise have done, because they got a 
larger grant to do it. ” 
6.2 Local action 
In contrast to the centralised finance structure of GIB, research found that catalysing local 
(i.e., municipal) government can create new partnerships, helping to address local finance 
gaps and “mobilize the entire value chain of local climate finance. Through these 
partnerships, the creation of a ‘market place’ is enabled.” [73](p 5).  
UK cities are taking up the cause. A director of retrofit company (#11) detailed how larger 
cities like Birmingham, Bristol and Sheffield have invested in energy or waste projects, often 
in partnership with the private sector. These authorities are thinking long-term and taking 
advantage of their ability to borrow money at low interest rates, especially in the current 
economic climate. This action might also reflect dissatisfaction with central government, as 
a think tank analyst (#1) explained, “there is a general trend for local authorities just being 
really fed up with governments flip flopping in policy and trying to drive this agenda forward 
themselves”. 
One of the largest and most successful domestic retrofit schemes in the UK was the Kirklees 
Warm Zone, which installed insulation in over 50,000 homes in the Kirklees area of West 
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Yorkshire in 2007-2010 [74]. The scheme was the initiative of the local authority (Kirklees 
Council), which funded just over half the £20.9m costs, with the remainder funded by 
private company Scottish Power, managed by a not-for-profit energy company, Yorkshire 
Energy Services [74,75].  
The scheme saw high uptake (nearly 3 in 10 households), notably exceeding standard 
projections for middle and high income areas. Energy use savings are estimated at 14.8% 
across participating households, with additional health benefits from warmer houses, 
stimulation of the local economy and a rise in house price value [74,75]. Webber et al. 
attribute the success to an emphasis on quality of installations and significant consumer 
engagement, including household visits and sustained marketing. Also, in contrast to the 
Green Deal, Kirklees Warm Zone offered free surveys and assessments, with free loft and 
cavity wall insulation installed where feasible [54,74].  
Examples like this support the case for local and regional initiatives to help realise the 
potential of energy efficiency programmes. Unfortunately, the centralisation of control and 
the loss of local and regional capacity in the UK has reduced the effectiveness of policies  
[76], and there are few initiatives which “focus on supporting Regional and Local financial 
institutions in identifying needs, opportunities and gaps.” [73](p 5). Such initiatives can be 
more effective, ensuring that environmental and social benefits of projects are internalised 
[73], for example, by taking advantage of local authorities’ knowledge of fuel poor and 
vulnerable households [40]. Moreover, local institutions and businesses, as well as 
community groups, are more widely trusted than central government and large energy 
corporations [5]. For example, some regulators prefer PAYS schemes where bills are 
collected by a housing association or local authority, distrusting utilities, due to the risk of 
disconnection in case of default [17].  
The ‘Civic Energy Sector’ refers to energy systems owned by local authorities and civil 
society structures such as communities, cooperatives and citizens, and their role in a 
transition to a low-carbon economy [8]. Local initiatives can be seen as examples of the UK’s 
small but growing civic energy sector, which has a potential to play an important role in 
financing and supporting energy efficiency and demand side management activities. The 
recent government Industrial Strategy Green Paper [27] suggests stronger, better developed 
sectoral and local institutions are good for economic competition. The description includes 
local financial institutions and local enterprise partnerships, compatible with the idea of a 
strong civic energy sector, although the emphasis is on the private sector, for example, 
giving businesses “direct role in shaping the future of their local communities” [27](p 120). 
We suggest a new framing for domestic energy efficiency would benefit from actively 
promoting the civic energy sector and increasing local capacity.    
7 Conclusions and policy implications 
Various policies over the years have not succeeded in raising energy efficiency of the UK 
housing stock fast enough to meet ambitious climate change targets. This paper argues 
there is a need for a new, more positive framing for domestic energy efficiency policy, which 
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moves beyond addressing barriers and market failures. We suggest have identified three 
aspects of a new policy framing: energy efficiency as infrastructure; new business and 
financing models for energy efficiency provision; and decentralised financing institutions for 
energy efficiency investment. We argue that this could help address the challenges of linking 
finance to energy efficiency projects by better addressing the needs of both householders 
and investors in order to create investable opportunities that are appropriate and attractive. 
We now offer some policy recommendations from our work. 
The first area of recommendations is around government action and leadership. While our 
interviewees had different opinions of the role of government and public finance, there was 
strong agreement that the UK government lacks the direction or long-term vision needed 
for a major energy efficiency overhaul. There is a lack of continuity, with changes in policy 
direction and agenda, damaging the energy efficiency sector as investments in skills are not 
rewarded, and confidence in policy drops. This (perceived) lack of leadership stems partly 
from a neoliberal political economy in the UK, which frames the low carbon transition in 
terms of state-enabled competitive markets [8]. However, short-termism and risk avoidance 
in the finance world suggest the markets cannot be expected to solve the energy efficiency 
problem on their own. The government needs to show strategic, long-term commitment to 
domestic energy efficiency improvements: public policy can affect the direction of 
innovation and change, including shaping and creating markets [77]. In other words, there is 
an important and necessary role for government in any large scale energy efficient 
retrofitting of UK homes, even if the mechanisms are to be market-based. Showing 
commitment and leadership are necessary in order to signal to the private sector that 
financial investment in energy efficiency is a long-term government priority. An example of 
such leadership is Mission Innovation, the intergovernmental initiative launched at COP 21 
to increase R&D funding for clean energy, in which the public sector seeks to draw in private 
sector investors [78]. An example at the national level might be reframing energy efficiency 
as an infrastructural issue, with government taking on responsibilities accordingly, including 
rewarding social benefits and providing capital spending where an investment gap now 
exists.  
The second area of recommendations is around guaranteed energy savings. Homeowners 
require guarantees for financial planning and trust building, as well as for considerations of 
home comfort. Both the German KfW and the Kirklees Warm Zone show examples of 
successfully demanding high renovation standards, partly through decentralised finance and 
action from local actors and networks. Empowerment of decentralised institutions, through 
nurturing the UK’s civic energy sector, could promote high standards, with local authorities 
and others working in collaboration with central government and in partnerships with the 
private sector. Government needs to work together with energy efficiency actors both to 
improve regulations for retrofits, but crucially also to ensure that innovators with new 
business models or value propositions are not hampered by current policies and regulations. 
These innovators can act as bottom up intermediaries who facilitate the creation of new 
business models and niche markets [79], as has been recommended in the energy services 
context [80]. Finally, a proven, sustained demand for energy efficiency is needed if private 
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finance is to be drawn in; guaranteeing energy savings would help challenge overly 
conservative risk assessments from the finance sector.  
A third area of recommendations is around the scale of the challenge. Millions of 
households in the UK require energy efficient retrofits in order to meet climate change and 
affordability targets, suggesting this could be an investment large enough to interest 
mainstream finance. However, these homes and households are too diverse for any one 
policy or funding stream to address. Different approaches are needed for able-to-pay 
homeowners and poorer households; tenants of private landlords require consideration due 
to split incentives; and deeper retrofits, which are not financially attractive, might need 
separate funding streams. While aggregation of many projects, for example through a 
revolving fund, might be appropriate for many households and a suitable vehicle to attract 
investors, the government still has a role: first, in ‘crowding in’ and otherwise attracting 
private investors – for example, by underwriting loans in order to de-risk investments and 
by accepting that some public finance investments are inevitable, for example, through 
grants to poorer households. Again, we point to the high profile Mission Innovation as an 
example of governments seeking to crowd in private sector funding [78]. This finding 
supports previous research arguing that a comprehensive and well-targeted mix of policy 
instruments, based on a range of economic perspectives and analysis of what works in 
practice, is needed for energy efficiency policy [81]. 
Our final recommendations concern engaging homeowners beyond information provision 
and financial incentives. A wider framing could incorporate whole house renovation, and 
aspects beyond energy savings, such as comfort and modernity. New business models can 
play a part, for example through having a single point of contact for the consumer, for 
information, renovation and finance; and through more holistic business models and chains 
of supply suited to deep retrofits and a whole house approach, rather than piecemeal 
installations [64]. Decentralised institutions, such as local government, and even (local) 
social networks can also play an important part through engagement with consumers and 
using local knowledge to build trust.  
While this study is UK based, and issues such as transforming housing stock to make it more 
sustainable are country and context specific, we believe there are lessons that can be 
generalised for other countries. Much of the finance related research we draw on is 
international. In the current global economic climate, there are limits to pure public funding 
on the one hand, while market-based solutions are limited by their very nature on the 
other. 
Our study suggests that levering investment at the household level, as the Green Deal 
attempted, is not a viable large scale solution. Rather, for the scale of finance needed, new 
finance mechanisms are needed to make investments attractive to both householders and 
investors. This includes considerations given to different business models that might appeal 




Thus, while the details of new framings for financing energy efficiency are be necessity 
country specific, depending on institutional settings, we believe the broad ideas outlined 
here are widely applicable. Specifically, we suggest treating energy efficiency as 
infrastructure, and decentralised financing institutions for local or regional funding, are two 
widely-applicable approaches. 
We do not offer a complete and rigid framing for financing domestic energy efficiency. 
However, we suggest that a successful framing that would better enable private finance to 
invest would include long-term government commitment, as for infrastructure; would foster 
new business models and funding streams; and would empower a variety of decentralised 
actors and intermediaries to successfully engage with households.  
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Appendix 1: questions for interviewees 
Below are the questions that guided the semi-structured interviews. These were not used as 
a script, but as a list of points to cover, as appropriate by position of interviewee.  
I: investment options. 
1. What are the current financial investments options in energy efficiency (EE) and demand 
side measures (DSM) ? 
2. What are the attitudes [in your sector] towards EE and DSM investment?  
(i.e., Are EE and DSM seen as viable investments?)  
Are attitudes changing? 
3. How do you see the main barriers to increased investment in EE and DSM? 
4. What might make the finance sector more interested in such investment? 
II: policy and regulation. 
5. How do you see the main regulatory barriers to increased investment in EE and DSM? 
6. What policies and regulations currently support such investment? 
7. What policies and regulations might increase such investment? 
8. What role should the government play in investing and enabling investments? 
Is public finance necessary or desirable to encourage investment? 
9. What do you think of framing energy efficiency as an infrastructure issue? 
10. Where does the demise of the Green Deal leave us? What might replace it? 
III: institutions, tools models. 
11. What role do institutions such as the Green Investment Bank play in large scale 
investments in EE and DSM? What role could they play? 
12. What other financial institutions might increase such investment? 
13. What financial tools or business models might enable and encourage such investment? 
e.g., green bonds? revolving funds? PPI? 
IV: local, city level. 
14. What opportunities are there at city level for large scale investment in EE and DSM? 
15. What are the main barriers to city- or council-scale investments? 
16. What policies or regulations might enable such investments? 




Appendix 2: summary of interviews 
Table 2 below summarises relevant views and insights from the interviews, loosely grouped 
by topic: finance, policy and government, business models and tools, and households. 
Table 2 below summarises relevant views and insights from the interviews, loosely 
grouped 






Several interviewees discussed the need for long-term investments and 
patient capital, and the problems of short-termism, which was blamed 
partly on the culture of the finance world.   
Pension funds were discussed as long-term, large-scale investors, although 
they don’t often invest in infrastructure. The shift towards defined 
contribution was seen as making longer-term investments more difficult. 
Cheaper and simpler fund management was also a consideration.  
public and private 
funds 
Several interviewees discussed issues of public and private funding of 
energy efficiency.  
The scale of investment suggests it cannot be publicly funded, and that 
‘throwing money’ at the problem was not helpful. Rather, the role of public 
finance could be to fund specific projects, underwrite and de-risk 
investments, and otherwise leverage or ‘crowd in’ private finance. It was 
recognised that there are currently few examples of private finance in the 
energy efficiency sector. 
The private sector would have a role in delivery, and the role of government 
could be in creating special purpose vehicles or public-private partnerships. 
It was stressed that that this needed to be managed with care to avoid 
giving perverse incentives to planners or otherwise having benefits 
‘siphoned off’ by the private sector.  
barriers to 
investment 
A few interviewees detailed barriers, risks and uncertainties to private 
sector investment. 
Barriers included lack of confidence in demand for energy efficiency; lack of 
credible projects for investment; and lack of expertise in financial 
institutions; all of which hampered the creation of a market for energy 
efficiency. Additional barriers are lack of visibility of energy efficiency 
investments as part of real estate assets; and fossil fuel subsidies which 
send the wrong signal. 
Risks mentioned include low returns, especially without standardisation, 
and difficulty evaluating energy efficiency investments.  
Standardisation and aggregation were mentioned as necessary for 
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financiers to invest, as individual – or even local – projects are too small and 
varied for large scale investment. Comparison to large and small scale 
renewable energy was made by some interviewees. 
policy and government 
leadership 
Several interviewees commented on the need for government direction and 
leadership in refurbishing the building stock. Currently, there are weak 
policies and a lack of long-term vision. 
Government roles mentioned included policy and regulation, leveraging 
private finance, directly financing elements that are a public good, such as 
data collection, and demand management.  
Overall, it was seen that government should lead on energy efficiency 
refurbishing of the national housing stock, with one suggestion that the 
government might be best placed to rollout large-scale refurbishment. 
Another interviewee highlighted that energy efficiency has been politicised 
(alongside issues such as energy poverty), complicating matters. Leadership 
could also be demonstrated using public estate portfolios. 
stability 
A few interviewees addressed long-term policy. There has been a lot of 
short-term thinking on renewable energy and energy efficiency; past policy 
shifts shocked the whole market. Without long-term policy being clear, the 
large energy companies will only deliver shorter term contracts. 
There is a need for a long-term energy efficiency strategy, with careful 
consideration of implementation, including detailed standards and sectoral 
policies, including building codes and appliance standards.  
There seems to be increased recognition from policymakers that energy 
efficiency is cost effective in fighting climate change.  
local action 
There has been a lot of action at local government level, with various cities 
having energy related projects. However, local government has limited 
powers in the UK. 
One example discussed was the Kirklees Warm Zone (see section... ), a 
successful regional energy efficiency refurbishment scheme, where half the 
money came from the local authority and half from an energy company, as 
a conduit for a government grant. 
business models and tools 
business models 
There were different views on the need of new business models for energy 
efficiency. There were suggestions that better benchmarks would be 
sufficient, but others thought that a new value proposition for 
householders was needed, and that the lack of a good proposition was part 
of the failure of the green deal.  
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Business models and mechanisms mentioned include household mortgages 
varying my energy efficiency rating and the Energiesprong refurbishment 
model at household level, up to revolving funds and even capacity markets 
with demand side bids to encourage larger scale investment and action. The 
motivation of suppliers was considered too, in terms of changing their 
business models to be better aligned with investments in long-term 
demand reduction. 
There was much criticism of the Green Deal (see section...), with mixed 
opinions about whether the basis of the scheme – the pay as you save 
mechanism – could be made to work at large scale, or whether the opt-in 
model was less effective than a systematic model. 
The Green Investment Bank was seen as only investing in large scale 
projects and avoiding households, unlike the German KfW. 
infrastructure 
There were mixed views on the possibility of treating energy efficiency as 
infrastructure (see section...). Conceptually, most agreed there was sound 
reasoning. However, in practice, only a few saw it as viable and desirable. 
Others were sceptical for reasons including the intangible nature of energy 
efficiency, the need for different mechanisms for different households, and 
the mismatch of scale between investors’ sums and the small individual 
energy efficiency projects.  
households 
behaviour 
There were various opinions on householders’ behaviour and motives for 
refurbishment, considering that demand for energy efficiency is a necessary 
part of the equation. Some suggested there is more money available for 
investment than demand for projects. 
Barriers to uptake include cost, hassle to find information and complexity of 
the process, and the disruption of the refurbishment itself. Another is 
cherry picking, with fast wins, such as loft and cavity wall insulation, already 
done for most houses, leaving more complex projects. The reputation of 
energy efficiency was also mentioned, with scare stories about the ‘green 
sector’ contributing to high energy bills. 
Reducing energy bills was not seen as a sufficiently attractive customer 
proposition. Rather, comfort and quality of life were seen as better 
motivators.  
 
 
 
